This chapter examines the ways in which so-called 'financial warfare' positions banks and financial institutions on the frontline of security practice, amounting to what I call a financesecurity assemblage. In the pursuit of terrorism financing, money comes to be considered as a 'tool of combat.' This chapter examines the interconnections between finance and security in the post-9/11 context, and analyses the novel spatial configurations that have accompanied the pursuit of terrorist monies. It focuses on the case of banking conglomerate HSBC, which incurred a record fine for circumventing US OFAC sanctions and prohibition. Unpacking this case shows how jurisdiction in this domain is articulated as transactional rather than territorial. It demonstrates how financial warfare profoundly impacts financial practices, shifting banks' risk calculations and client profiling, and rerouting global financial flows.
forum to tackle money laundering, the FATF was given a new life when it was charged with pursuing terrorism financing after 9/11. Formally, compliance with FATF recommendations is voluntary and best-practice-based. However, in practice, FATF members work hard to achieve positive scores and reports on their activities from this increasingly important forum (Heng and McDonagh 2008; Huelsse and Kerwer 2007) . FATF has incorporated extensive terrorism financing recommendations among its money laundering guidance to states, and the aim of the report about ISIL was to design further strategies for "disrupting and dismantling" ISIL financing (FATF 2015, p. 32) . The report advocates active use of financial sanctions against (suspected) foreign fighters and disrupting financial flows to ISIL territories. Banks and financial institutions are required to monitor and report funds potentially linked to ISIL and to the travel of foreign fighters.
Geographical markers play an important role in the FATF document: while the report does not formally propose monitoring or reducing transactions to Syria and Iraq as territorial entities, banks are warned especially of transactions to and from "conflict zones or areas where ISIL operates" (FAFT 2015, p. 19) . All 17 anonymised 'case study' examples in the report discuss examples of money transfers, travel and cash carrying to Syria, Saudi-Arabia and Turkish border regions. Case examples in the report place special emphasis on the dangers of funds being diverted from charitable collections (in, for example, Italy and Canada) to "aid terrorists and their families" in the Syria-Iraq-Turkey border regions (FATF 2015, p. 20) . The report concludes by noting the "diverse geographic scope of the terrorist financing risk" associated with ISIL, and the need to develop further strategies to "stop, restrain and enable confiscation of cash when reasonable grounds for suspicion exist of terrorist financing" (FATF 2015, p. 40) .
Two elements of the FATF report frame the more general concerns of this chapter.
First, the report positions banks and financial institutions on the frontline in the fight against ISIL. Banks have to detect and disrupt transactions possibly related to ISIL oil and antiques smuggling, as well to financial support from family and friends to individuals in contested territories in Syria and Iraq. This gives banks new complex responsibilities to freeze and report funds. Second, the spatial imaginaries in the report grapple with what is thought of as a dispersed and diffuse threat. While notions of danger in the war on terrorism are certainly territorial (Elden 2007 ) -focusing explicitly on Iraq, Syria, Turkey -they are also constitutive of new, networked, understandings of danger (Coward 2009; . The FATF report presents a complex geography in which charitable donations in Canada are thought to support violence in Syria; and ATM withdrawals at the Turkish-Syria border indicate potential travel of (what are now commonly called) foreign fighters. The FATF report on ISIL funding seeks to outline a strategy to filter and interrupt potentially suspicious transactions to a diffusely defined border region and along specific travel routes. What's left implicit in the report, however, is its equally important objective of continued facilitation of financial flows to other parts -and with other parties -of Syria and adjacent territories. In this sense, the politics of the FATF report is one of defining 'good' and 'bad' circulation, which is how Foucault typified the practice of security. Instead of a strategy focused on "fixing and demarcating the territories," the strategy of the FATF is one "of allowing circulations to take place, ... controlling them, sifting the good and the bad, ensuring that things are always in movement … but in such a way, that the inherent dangers of this circulation are cancelled out" (Foucault 2007, p. 65 ; also Amoore and de Goede 2008) .
The 2015 FATF report follows a longer but relatively invisible intensification of what has been called "financial warfare" (Zarate 2013) or the "weaponisation of finance" (Holodny 2015) . Juan Zarate, former US Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, calls countering terrorist and illicit financial flows a "new form of warfare," whereby private-sector interests and the banking sector are leveraged to "uncover the financial footprints and relationships of the terrorist network" (2013, p. 29) . For Zarate, it is a way to harness the power of US financial institutions in the service of security interests and the global war on terror. Financial warfare positions banks and financial institutions on the frontline of security practice and fighting terrorism. It carves out a new role for money and finance in security, whereby money comes to be considered as a "tool of combat" (Gilbert 2015a, p. 205; also Gilbert 2015b) . At the same time, financial warfare profoundly impacts financial practices, and has the capacity to shift banks' risk calculations and reroute international money flows.
This chapter examines the interconnections between finance and security in the post-9/11 context, and analyses the novel spatial configurations that have accompanied the pursuit of terrorist monies. I develop the term finance/security assemblage to analyse the uneasy alliances between banks and financial institutions on the one hand, and security authorities including intelligence agencies and police on the other, that are emerging here (also de Goede 2012) . Countering terrorism financing does not so much erect new national borders within the global juggernaut of financialisation -as it has sometimes been understood (Biersteker 2004) -but enacts reconfigurations of regulatory space/time, that impact financial practices and enable security decisions in particular ways.
This chapter focuses on the spatiality of financial warfare, and analyses the way in which US authorities have rearticulated their jurisdictional reach in recent investigations to encompass all dollar-denominated transactions globally. Luiza Bialasiewicz and colleagues have suggested that security spaces can be understood as "imaginative geographies," articulated, carved out and performed "by a variety of security advisers and popular academic commenters" (Bialasiewicz et al 2007, p. 409) . The production of space, in this analysis, functions through "citational practices" whereby state-based geographical imaginaries resonate with popular culture and academic commentary (Bialasiewicz et al 2007, p. 409) .
Space, in this sense, involves the work of spacing: it is "an effect of practices of representation, valorization and articulation" (Gregory 2004, p. 19; also Gregory and Pred 2007) . This chapter hones in on the recent investigation of British banking conglomerate HSBC by the US Senate and the US Department of Justice, and interrogates the performativity of space in this case. The new geographies of financial warfare do not just have an impact on banks' compliance practices, but also influence banks' risk calculations concerning un/viable transactions, clients and business lines. The chapter starts with an analysis of post-9/11 financial warfare as the development of new spatio-temporal modes of security intervention, and puts forward the notion of 'assemblage' as a helpful analytical starting point. It then goes on to analyse the configurations of risk at work in new pre-crime modes of suspicious transactions detection, and focuses on recent debates concerning preemptive account closures in the UK.
Finance/Security Assemblage
Though the political urgency of pursuing suspect money flows and potential financing of terrorism has increased significantly since September 2001, its juridical history predates the 9/11 attacks. In 1999, the United Nations adopted the Convention on the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, which obliges member states to criminalise the act of 'terrorist financing', defined in a broad sense as the wilful provision or collection of funds or assets ("of every kind") with the intention that they should be used or in the knowledge that they are to be used, in full or in part, in order to carry out … Any … act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian … when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act. 2 In this manner, the Convention developed a de facto definition of terrorism -which had been controversial at the UN level throughout the 1970s and 1980s. The UN Convention is said to have created a veritable "paradigm shift" in its redefinition of terrorism beyond violent acts, enabling a broad criminalisation of financing and facilitating acts (Lehto 2008) . Financial institutions and intermediaries were newly charged with identifying transactions potentially linked to terrorism, policing remittances and judging the legitimacy of wire transfers or ATM transactions. If the pursuit of money laundering focused on big cash amounts and post-crime transactions, the new responsibilities for banks and other financial institutions in the context of pursuing terrorism financing focus on identifying small, mundane transactions potentially linked to future crimes (Malkin and Elizur 2002) . In other words, the focus of banks and regulators is increasingly on relatively small transactions, understood to be "pre-crime" (Zedner 2007 ).
When, in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, transnational money laundering and counter-terrorism financing regulation were propelled to the top of policy agendas, some observers celebrated a renewed state sovereignty in the globalising market place. Thomas Biersteker (2004, p. 73) , for example, welcomed the "sea change in the tolerance of financial re-regulation across the globe," while William Vlcek (2008) declared a 'Leviathan Rejuvenated.' However, a focus on the reassertion of sovereign statehood underplays the spatio-temporal complexities of the war on terrorism financing. Instead of an unequivocal resurgence of state sovereignty in the regulatory landscape, we observe new 'assemblages', through which administrative governmental power is allied with private companies. This includes, for example, placing banks and other private money transfer companies like Western Union and SWIFT on the frontline of security practice. These companies are both newly empowered to deem transactions suspicious and to block them, and uneasily positioned to perform as quasi-official security agencies.
Elsewhere, I argue that countering terrorism financing is perhaps less about cutting off financial flows to terrorists, and more about enabling new spatio-temporal strategies of security intervention (de Goede 2012) . The effectiveness of countering terrorism financing is disputed and difficult to measure (e.g. Deloitte 2011, p. 95; Levi 2010 However, this chapter proposes a shift in perspective, for at least two reasons. First, though we can safely say that the power of financial warfare overwhelmingly emanates from the US (but also the EU), this still says little about the configurations of power inside the US. As a focus on the HSBC case below shows, jurisdictional reach is not simply exercised, but is reworked and reconfigured in the name of countering terrorism financing. In a sense, we may say that the "US" is itself a mobile configuration -elements of which become (dis)empowered (Allen and Cochrane 2007; . In this context, the power of the US Senate and the relatively little-known US Treasury Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) are critically interrogated. Secondly, the power of financial warfare is enacted through complex alliances with the private sector, as has been noted above. This has important implications for how we understand geographies of power: freezing, reporting and confiscating are ultimately done by mid-level financial bureaucrats and within the private, commercial spaces of banks and financial institutions. These private actors do not simply implement policies, but enact them in ways that foster new directions and graft on novel (commercial) goals (Amicelle and Jakobsen 2016) .
To start addressing the complex geographies of power in financial warfare, we can draw upon a rich literature that theorises financial practices as specific forms of time/space "imaginaries" (Pryke and Allen 2000) . For Pryke and Allen, financial instruments such as derivatives should be understood as "monetized time/space" because they commercialise temporal uncertainties and geographical differences, allowing companies to hedge them (or speculators to bet on them) (2000, p. 282). Put simply, derivatives render the uncertain future tradeable in the present: their rationale is to "help make the future both profitable and secure" In other words, the familial obligations of remittance-sending migrants cannot just be reduced to the 'micro'-element of a macro-economic aggregate, but are an important part of this economic configuration. Similarly, Langley (2008, p. 24) emphasises that researchers should resist "the temptation to simply explain developments within 'small' everyday networks in terms of an apparently 'bigger picture' of 'the financial system.'" Instead, what matters is whether and how financial practices are connected to longer or shorter financial networks "that continually have to be worked upon" (Leyshon 1997, p. 389 ).
In addition, a large body of literature problematises the assumption that offshore financial centers are geographically distant from the financial centers of London, New York or Tokyo. Though territorially distant and inscribed with cultural difference, the practice of 'offshore' is intimately connected to centers of global finance and the ways in which financial instruments are structured, negotiated and traded. As Susan Roberts (1994, p. 111) Agamben (2009, p. 3) , an assemblage is defined through its heterogeneity, its strategic functionality, and its operation at the intersection of power and knowledge (1990, p. 3) . An assemblage, then, is understood as "heterogeneous…political formation," that is mobile, emergent and dispersed -but that nevertheless excises considerable power in the name of its strategic functionality (Allen 2011, p. 154) . Conceptually, it helps explain how the interplay of a heterogeneity of elements, including, for example "regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures… [and] moral and philanthropic propositions," enables a certain strategic functionality and outcome (Foucault, quoted in Agamben 2009, p. 2) . This interplay may at times lead to relatively stable formations and "well-ordered coherent wholes" (Bueger 2013, p. 62) . However, such stability and order can never be assumed or taken for granted, but needs to be itself explained.
Thus, in my analysis of the strategic outcomes of the pursuit of terrorism financing, I am not necessarily arguing that policies have hidden agendas that deviate from their stated objective.
On the contrary, it is the cumulative effect of the finance-security assemblage doing "exactly what it says on the cover" that, taken together, produce these effects (Christophers 2012 financing. Cleary, a strong transnational policy agenda to reregulate transnational banks and impose substantial compliance duties and fines is broadly understood as restricting the power of capital (rather than fostering it). At the same time however, important opportunities are emerging for (US-based) firms and financial data mining software companies.
The HSBC Settlement
In 2012 65) calls security; and "that is no longer that of fixing and demarcating the territory, but of allowing circulations to take place, of controlling them, sifting the good and the bad, ensuring that things are always in movement."
In with so-called 'know-your-customer' procedures based less on global compliance practices, and more on personal contact and local knowledge. Part of the problem with Mexican branches of HSBC, for example, which allegedly served as conduits for drug money, appeared to be that local branches functioned independently of the Mexican head office, and had incentives to bring in business. As noted during the hearings, the Mexican local branches operated with "a performance management system … inherited from the former Bital bank that was heavily focused on business growth rather than control … In addition … Mexico was a data-poor environment, making it difficult to verify the identities of customers" (US Senate 2012a, p. 23). The local Mexican branches functioned with models of trust and personal contact in assessing money laundering risks that in most countries have been superseded by electronic systems for detecting suspicious or abnormal transactions (Leyshon and Thrift, 1999; Maurer 2005) .
The point here is not to dispute the money laundering concerns regarding Mexican transactions, but to render visible the workings of an assemblage in which local Mexican bank branches are disciplined into operating with particular modes of assessing money laundering risk and into complying with US sanctions lists. One of the concrete outcomes of the hearings was HSBC's pledge to "adopt and enforce the adherence to a single standard globally that is determined by the highest standard that we must apply anywhere" (US Senate 2012a, p. 51). It was also acknowledged, that often, "this will mean adhering globally to US regulatory standards" -meaning that, effectively, US standards and sanctions become enforced in local Mexican banks, through private sector decisions at the HSBC London head office (Larner and Laurie 2010 groups not tied to particular territories, but connected to al Qaeda and diffuse terrorist networks (Sullivan 2015) . Nevertheless, significant differences remain in the precise composition of sanctions lists in different regions and, in particular, on the two sides of the Atlantic. There has been significant resistance from the European Court of Justice in recent years on the legitimacy of sanctions measures, for example in the case of Iran. In 2013, the ECJ annulled the sanctions against a number of Iranian companies and banks, partly because the European Council (which formally takes the sanctions decision in the EU) "has not proved the facts of which it accuses those four companies." When reinserted into this longer historical narrative, we can understand the fine imposed on HSBC as a novel mode of leveraging US currency power in order to take action against the Saudi bank, effectively circumventing the UK libel Court decision. The novel imaginary of jurisdiction as transactional rather than territorial, pressured HSBC to sever business ties with a bank that is not on the EU sanctions list in 2010. The HSBC investigation enforced the prohibition against dealing with al-Rahji extraterritorially, even though the bank was not sanctioned in Europe or the Middle East, and helped cut it off from global financial circulations.
A final element to be drawn out about the finance/security assemblage, which, as we have seen, operates through extraterritorial administrative measures, is its market power. The pursuit of terrorist monies and active interference with banking activities can easily be seen as a constraint on market power and a reassertion of the state -especially because it signalled a "U-turn" for the Bush government, which prior to 9/11 pledged to resist global money laundering regulation (Warde 2007) . However, this is not simply a state-versus-market story.
A substantial market in professional compliance services, companies and software is fostered through Senate and OFAC actions. The market in compliance software, that helps banks mine for suspicions transactions and fulfil regulatory obligations, has grown significantly in recent years, and is expected to exceed US$10 billion in the coming two years (Keatinge 2014, p. 50) . One of the Senate recommendations was that the HSBC US affiliate increase AntiMoney Laundering (AML) resources, "hire qualified staff … and implement an effective AML monitoring system for account and wire transfer activity … including OFAC alerts"
(US Senate 2012a, p. 12). During the hearing, it became apparent that HSBC has since contracted financial technology firm Norkom to deliver compliance software to fulfil these obligations. As the new chief executive of HSBC Bank USA put it: "We have installed NORKOM. It has been a huge investment" (US Senate Hearing 2012a: 65). Norkom is one of the market leaders in software compliance products and was bought by British defense multinational BAE systems for €271million in 2011 (Brown 2011) .
Risk and Preemptive Account Closures
The HSBC investigation and settlement is a window onto the workings of a finance/security assemblage, in which jurisdictional reach became understood as transactional instead of territorial, through the notion of the US currency domain. As mentioned, the HSBC case was one of a number of settlements between OFAC, the US Justice Department and European banks. By following the leads of the HSBC case further, we can see how the recent OFAC fines 'resonate' across global banking assemblages, reorient risk assessments, and affect in very specific ways banking access and international remittances. In short, the HSBC case eventually led to great societal concerns over banking access of migrant and vulnerable client groups, as this section discusses. Counter-terrorism financing regulation purposefully allows banks and other financial institutions substantial discretion in implementation, to encourage them to remain vigilant and pro-active. According to Faravel-Garrigues and colleagues (2008, p. 2) , "banking institutions enjoy a wide room for maneuver" and have become "sentinels" for police and security work.
Often, banks' in-house risk assessments rely on datasets and analytical software tools developed by commercial vendors, for example Norkom, Thomson Reuters and Fiserv. The ways in which knowledge is generated concerning suspicious transactions inside banks, combine software-generated 'red flags' with situated judgements based on "personal regard and ethical scrutiny" (Maurer 2005, p. 477 Sanctions lists, in their analysis, "acquire multiple, simultaneous identities in the course of
[their] banking appropriation (from a compliance and disciplinary device to an inclusionary and exclusionary device)" (2016, p. 30) . In short, business logics and commercial objectives become 'grafted onto' the instruments that are supposed to detect terrorist finance or money laundering risks (Li 2007) .
During the Hearings, representatives of HSBC worked very hard to satisfy the Senate that they were aware of terrorist financing and money laundering risks in their organisation and prepared to remedy past mistakes. One of the problems at HSBC, it appeared, was a backlog of "over 17,000 alerts" generated in (automated) compliance systems that required further review in order to assess whether these should lead to suspicious transactions reports, The account closures by HSBC and Barclays can be understood as preemptive because they
were not motivated by past misuse, but to avoid potential future abuse. As Claudia Aradau 
Conclusion
In the wake of the Paris attacks of November 2015, the G20 released a statement reaffirming the commitment to "tackling the financing channels of terrorism" and implementing FATF standards in "all jurisdictions" 19 The pursuit of suspect monies and potential terrorism financing is a seemingly targeted and relatively non-violent response in the war on terror, that places banks in the frontline of global security practice. This chapter has examined the increasingly pressing agenda of pursuing terrorism financing by starting with the US$1.9
billion settlement between HSBC and OFAC, and argued that it entails important and relatively invisible reconfigurations of geographical jurisdiction and financial client risk. In and client risk profiles, for example concerning the MBS sector. In some cases, banks now prefer to terminate rather than monitor high-risk client relationships, especially in the case of low-profit but high-risk sectors like money transfer services and charities.
Conceptually, I have developed the notion of a finance-security assemblage to capture the particular transnational configurations of power in the pursuit of terrorism financing.
Here, traditional national jurisdictional boundaries are circumvented and US sanctions decisions become enforced with global reach. My analysis has suggested that a finance/security assemblage exerts substantial power through administrative fines, whereby the US Senate investigation resonates with technical compliance decisions and banks' risk appetite assessments, resulting in the debanking of vulnerable client groups, including remittance-dependent families. These configurations work through little-known administrative procedures, via commercial risk assessment modules, to affect the everyday lived realities of migrant networks. Understanding these developments as an assemblage is not meant to downplay the hegemonic power of the US in this domain. Instead, it "broadens the range of places to look for ... the sources of harmful effects" and looks to "long-term strings of events" (Bennett 2010, p. 37, emphasis added) . It takes seriously the independent decisions inside banks and the power of technical risk assessments, and draws attention to multiple potential sites of responsibility for harmful effects including derisking.
